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Millions of Americans pay attention to US stock market news. They get this news from many sources. Print outlets, 24-hour news networks, and thousands of websites provide scores of financial reports. Many of these reports focus on the rises and falls of major stock indices. As Robert Shiller (2001:60) puts it, "Nothing beats the stock market for sheer frequency of interesting news items."
One reason for increased attention to the stock market is a dramatic shift in responsibility for the post-work well being of American workers. Part of the shift is from employers to workers. Participation in defined benefit plans (e.g., pensions) has dropped significantly over the past two decades while participation in defined contribution plans (e.g., IRAs, 401(k)s and 403(b)s) has skyrocketed (Poterba et al 2006) . A parallel shift from government to workers is also occurring due to growing doubts about the extent to which Americans can count on Social Security for retirement income. As the 2007 Annual Report of the Social Security Administration states:
"The financial condition of the Social Security and Medicare programs remains problematic; we believe their currently projected long run growth rates are not sustainable under current financing arrangements. Social Security's current annual surpluses of tax income over expenditures will soon begin to decline and then turn into rapidly growing deficits as the baby boom generation retires…. The longer we wait to address these challenges, the more limited will be the options available, the greater will be the required adjustments, and the more severe the potential detrimental economic impact on our nation." Where recent generations looked to employers or government for post-work guarantees of income, younger and middle-age workers have a different future ahead.
Their future financial security is more likely to depend on their own and others' 1 Whether the federal government will sustain Social Security at current levels for future generations or cut benefits is an open question. According to the report, "Social Security could be brought into actuarial balance over the next 75 years in various ways, including an immediate increase of 16 percent in payroll tax revenues or an immediate reduction in benefits of 13 percent or some combination of the two. Ensuring that the system is solvent on a sustainable basis beyond the next 75 years would require larger changes. To the extent that changes are delayed or phased in gradually, larger adjustments in scheduled benefits and revenues would be required that would be spread over fewer generations." investment decisions. As a result, what Americans believe about the stock market is important -not just to their own financial futures but also to governments and others whose assistance will be sought if scores of people make bad investment choices simultaneously. For these and other reasons, the conclusions Americans draw from stock market news have important implications.
In what follows, we use several analytic methods to examine how a key piece of information about stock market performance is communicated through news reports and understood by citizens. The piece of information is the value of a stock index "point."
Many "business" or "finance" news segments begin with reports about the daily movements of major stock indices. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is usually the index described first. A common highlight of such reports is that a stock index is up or down a certain number of "points" (e.g., "the Dow was up 30 points today and the S&P was up 7"). On days when these point totals rise or fall by large amounts or reach record levels they grab headlines. Do media reports of this kind fuel a consequential mass blindness? We argue that they do. While many reports focus people's attention on the changing number of DJIA "points," few, if any, offer information indicating the frequently changing value of a DJIA "point." Hence, people regard a DJIA point in the way that they do a "centimeter" or a "day" --as a metric of constant value. We call this phenomenon point blindness.
Point blindness will contribute to a reduced quality of life for scores of Americans if the ailment leads them to systematically misestimate stock values relative to other stores of value. It also increases the risk of new demands on government if many people make these errors simultaneously.
In what follows, we explain how the value of a DJIA point has changed in recent years, examine the extent to which this change has been reported, derive a simple palliative to counter point blindness, and evaluate the palliative using an experiment. We do this in four steps.
First, we use a thought experiment entitled "Loonies Under Your Bed" to show how point blindness, in combination with a widely-unappreciated recent drop in the value of "DJIA points," casts the oft-reported gains of the "extended bull market of 2002-2007" in a sobering light. It also puts a darker spin on subsequent declines in market indices.
Second, we examine how a leading media outlet reports stock market information.
Our content analysis of New York Times stories during the fall of 2006, when the DJIA was reported as having broken many records, confirms that its reports do not alert readers to changes in the value of index points. The finding implies that potentially important information about the recent dilution in the value of a DJIA point went unreported by leading media outlets. Hence, these outlets have fueled point blindness amongst those persons who rely on them for news about stock values.
Third, we use psychological research on selective attention to argue that an alternative means of presenting stock market information can help people adapt to point blindness. The change entails a commitment to presentations that make objectively relevant variations in the value of a DJIA point easier to see. We argue that these alternatives are simple to implement and can be easily understood by a mass audience.
Fourth, we offer the results of an experiment run on a nationally representative sample of over 2000 Americans in 2008. It demonstrates that simple changes in how DJIA point information is conveyed has large effects on how the public perceives the stock market. These simple changes provide a counter to point blindness for many people.
We conclude by arguing that the shift in retirement income responsibility from employers and government to workers is one of several societal factors that make a recognition of point blindness important. Combating point blindness by paying greater attention to how stock market information is conveyed and understood is a topic in which individuals and governments have a long-term interest.
"Loonies Under Your Bed"
Here, we describe a thought experiment that highlights the economic significance of point blindness. The experiment can begin on any day in the years 2001 through 2005.
For the sake of example, we focus on January 2, 2001, the first day in our database. Later, we will show that what we find to be true about this day is true for many others.
On the start date of the experiment, a subject is given the number of US dollars (USD) that matches the closing point total of the DJIA. On January 2, 2001, this amount is $10,646.15. With this money, she can do one of two things. Option 1. Use her USD to buy "one share of that day's DJIA." On January 2, 2001, such a purchase will result in her owning approximately 6.5 shares of each of the DJIA's 30 components. The reason that "one share of the January 2, 2001 DJIA" gives her so many shares of stock is that the reported DJIA point total is the sum of the components' listed closing prices adjusted by a divisor. The DJIA divisor is adjusted after any significant change in a DJIA component or in the index itself. Its purpose is to reduce the impact of such events on daily movements of the DJIA's point total. On January 2, 2001, the divisor was 0.15369402, which meant that the summed cost of one share of each DJIA component was 1636.25 USD. So for 10646.15 USD, the subject can purchase 6.506432 shares of each component. To simplify the example, we assume that she pays no commissions or other transaction costs when acquiring or selling the stocks, she collects any dividends that accrue to the stocks that she holds, and she benefits from splits or similar passive benefits of stock ownership.
Option 2. Go to a bank and exchange 10,646.15 USD for the number of Canadian dollars (CAD) that have the same worth on that day. Again, to keep the example simple, we will assume that she does not pay any fees for the exchange. On January 2, 2001, the CAD-USD exchange rate was 1.4963, so she can obtain 15,929.83 CAD.
There is one additional rule. Whichever option she chooses, she must put the assets under her bed and keep them there until a pre-specified "cash out" date. Until that date, she must be a completely passive investor. For the purpose of the example, we focus on a "cash out" date of December 27, 2006 -the date on which the DJIA achieved its highest point total of any year up to and including 2006. Later, we examine the consequences for all possible "cash out" dates ranging from one year after the start date to December 31, 2006 -the last day in our database. So, if she buys the stocks, she cannot change her investments if something better comes along and she cannot sell any of her holdings in order to buy a good or service. If a company she owns offers a choice about how to handle a dividend or proceeds from a spin-off, she experiences the consequence that comes from being passive (i.e., not responding).
2 This implies that dividends can be accumulated but not invested. In short, she must put the stock certificates and any passive gains under her bed where, for the purpose of the example, we will assume they are safe.
If she takes the Canadian dollars, parallel rules apply. She cannot put the money in a bank and collect interest. She cannot reinvest it, spend it, or otherwise exchange it.
The currency must go under her bed, where it will be safe.
Before choosing, note that this assumption introduces a bias that favors Option 1.
Option 1 allows the subject to own shares of firms that hold assets in interest bearing accounts. Gains from the accounts can raise the firms' share prices or be transferred to investors through dividends. So, choosing Option 1 can provide interest income to the subject in a way that Option 2 cannot. We accept the asymmetry because it follows from our core assumption of investor passivity.
What should the subject do? Should she purchase multiple shares of thirty widelyowned icons of American industry during a period that was widely hailed as an "extended bull market" or obtain a currency that is rarely held by Americans or discussed in stock market news?
Before answering this question, we introduce a simplification. Instead of talking about US dollars and Canadian dollars, which can get confusing to people who are accustomed to thinking about "dollars" without respect to nation of origin, we will refer to the Canadian currency by its distinct nickname. In Canada, the dollar is nicknamed "the loonie." This nickname is so given because the dollar coin has loons (geese) engraved on its front. So on December 27, 2006, the value of the subject's "share of the DJIA" was 9903.57 USD. But, the subject's investment is worth more than this. When we add passive gains (dividends received, additional shares gained from splits, and revenues coming from spinoffs), the USD value of her assets is 14023.49.
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So if she sells the stocks on December 27, 2006, she realizes a gain of 3377.34 USD. But she has to pay taxes on this gain. Since she held the assets for more than a year, the tax rate on her capital gains and dividends is 15% (assuming that the subject's total income is in the middle to upper ranges Since the loonies were simply held under a bed, this gain is not taxable.
Loonies under a bed provided a better return than investing in the most widelyreported stock market index soon after the collapse of the dot-com stock bubble and selling when it achieved its record high point total of 2006. But to generate this example, we chose a specific ending date. Does the same result emerge on other "cash out" dates? Using one year as the shortest holding period simplifies our presentation of posttax consequences and biases the next result in favor of Option 1 (as returns from assets held for periods of less than a year can be taxed at substantially higher rates). We also assumed that the proceeds from the sale of "one share of the DJIA" would be taxed under the investment-friendly tax code revisions of May 2003 even if the "cash out" date in our analysis occurred before that date. Had we allowed shorter holding periods or calculated returns using the earlier tax rates, the post-tax returns for Option 1 would be no better and, in some cases, substantially worse.
Returning to Figure 2 , red pixels depict holding periods in which loonies outperform the DJIA share. Green pixels depict the opposite. In 97% of all holding periods (756,237/775,929) "loonies under a bed" outperform "one share of the DJIA." 6 If, by some means, the subject could avoid the taxman when her "cash out" date arrived, she would be better off with loonies under a bed on 62% (480,423/779,529) of the possible holding periods. In reality, however, she must pay taxes. Hence, measured multiple ways, and making several assumptions that favor Option 1, we find that placing loonies-a currency to which few Americans pay attention-under a bed provided greater investment returns to investors than would buying a share of the nation's most widely-reported stock index during a period that was widely hailed as an extended bull market of financial significance.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
A parallel result holds for the Euro, a currency that receives far more global attention than the loonie. Conducting an analysis that follows the procedures just described above, we find that holding "one share of the DJIA" for one year or greater during a period widely viewed as one of the longest bull markets US history consistently provided inferior returns to the alternative investment. In 86% of all holding periods of one year or greater (667,601/779529), "Euros under a bed" provided a greater post-tax return than "one share of the DJIA."
This thought experiment's outcome was driven by a fall in the value of the USD relative to the Euro and the CAD. But the fall of the USD against these currencies was not an isolated incident. As Figure 3 shows, from the beginning of 2001 to the end of 6 The reason that more than 3 percent of the figure appears to be red is that this image is made of far less than 800,000 pixels. All pixel-reducing coloration algorithms that we could have used produce a bias, we chose an algorithm that has a bias towards green pixels. 8 Consider an alternate interpretation of this result. On January 2, 2001, let the subject purchase "one share of the DJIA" for the USD equivalent of 15,929.83 CAD. Her post-tax revenue from selling these assets on December 27, 2006 would be the USD equivalent of 15,693.11 CAD. This is 236.72 CAD less than her original investment. Measured in CAD terms, the DJIA investor is worse off financially despite selling on the highest DJIA closing date of 2006. Indeed, on any day that the loonie line is north of the DJIA line in Figure 1 , DJIA investors lost value when in CAD terms.
2006, the USD fell against not only the loonie and the Euro, but also against other important benchmarks such as an ounce of gold and a barrel of oil.
[ Figure 3 Here] So, even during the extended bull market of 2002-2007, when the DJIA was reported as hitting a spectacular sequence of record highs, the value of the USD relative to other focal financial metrics declined sharply. Viewed from this perspective, the meaning of DJIA "point" increases and record highs is diluted. The point metric does not provide the same information that it did before the USD's fall.
What do these results mean to Americans? 8 The answer is that many hold most of their assets in USD-denominated terms. Those assets include stocks. News reports focus attention on changing attributes of the stocks and/or the index's changing "point" totals.
They rarely, if ever, provide any indication that the meaning of these points are changing because of their relation to USD. The reports, therefore, fuel point blindness amongst their readers. To the extent that readers or viewers perceived stocks as valuable because widely-publicized indices were "breaking records," point blindness likely led them to overvalue stocks relative to other investment vehicles and stores of value. Thus, this thought experiment offers an example where point blindness can skew investors' perceptions in ways that are economically significant.
How the News Fuels Point Blindness: A Content Analysis
If many people would benefit from thinking about stock market reports in ways that reflect the changing value of DJIA points, then most news reports are unhelpful. During the extended bull market of 2002-2007, news outlets produced many stories about the rise of the DJIA. They also offered many stories on the fall of the USD. However, they offered few, if any, stories that related the two topics.
July 12, 2007 was the kind of day on which we would most expect to see such a connection. On this day the USD hit a record low against the Euro and approached a multi-decade low against the loonie. On the same day, the DJIA achieved a record high.
On July 14, the New York Times published a story that discussed the day's events. included articles that were published on October 6 and October 7) and included the word "Dow" in their headline, lead paragraph or key terms. Fifty articles published over a total of 32 days met these criteria. 11 Table 1 gives an overview of our findings.
[ Table 1 Many nations' main stock indices are shown to outperform the DJIA. Norris (2006) points out that his finding is based, in part, on the USD's decline. "Most European markets are shown as being higher than they were in early 2000, but most or all of those increases reflect the fact that the moves are based on dollar performance. The CAC 40 in France, for example, is shown as being up 13 percent, but it is down almost 10 percent in euros. The gain came solely from the dollar's weakness."
11 We excluded the "Inside" and "Today in Business" features, as they simply tease inside content by providing verbatim quotes from full articles. We coded each article for the following characteristics: (1 The Times' presentations, and that of other leading media outlets, regularly reinforce a point blindness that limits the informative value of these financial reports to their audiences. In making this claim, we follow arguments about the difference between nominal and real asset values that academic economists have made for decades (e.g., Fisher 1928 , Shafir et al 1997 . Given the length of time for which such real-nominal problems have been known, one could claim this scholarship's implications should be widely understood in the DJIA context. Our content analysis reveals that they are not.
When reporting on changes in the value of commodities, such as oil and gold, financial news outlets regularly tie price changes to variations in the USD when such ties are appropriate. But when it comes talking about US stock markets, real-nominal lessons have been cast aside. As a result, the lingering problem relating to public understanding of the value of stock market indices is not with the scholarship itself, but in how media outlets forget about it when conveying stock market information to the public. 
Countering Point Blindness by Changing the News
To this point we've shown that point blindness is consequential and is fueled by media coverage of the stock market. Now, we turn to the question of what to do about this. We argue that a simple and easy-to-implement change in media presentations of stock market information can increase the informative value of these reports to broad audiences. We begin this phase of our effort by describing a psychological phenomenon that not only explains why so few people have been inquisitive about the changing value of DJIA points, but also how alternate presentations could increase their interest.
The relevant psychological phenomenon is selective attention. In many cases, people direct their attention selectively to only a fraction of the stimuli available to them.
Such selective attention often facilitates efficient decision making and eases an individual's cognitive load. Point blindness is a product of selective attention. It results when people selectively pay attention to fluctuations in the total number of points while ignoring the underlying value of the points. In what follows, we use economic and psychological research on selective attention to explain why economic news reports reinforce point blindness. We also use this research as a foundation from which we develop alternative ways of conveying stock market news that can counter point blindness.
Many economists have recognized that selective attention provides an efficient cognitive foundation for decision making. Scholars as far back as Simon (1955) , for example, argued that people cannot pay attention to every piece of information available to them. To save cognitive effort, people pay attention to some attributes of incoming information and ignore others. Such selectivity is efficient when limited amounts of information are sufficient for making effective choices (Simon 1955, 106-107) . Building from such ideas, other economists have examined how individuals direct their attention. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) argue that people pay attention to information that is most salient. Gabaix et al (2006) provide a more conditional argument suggesting that people pay attention to informational details that are relevant to the decision they are making and that vary across the alternatives from which they can choose.
These economic studies, however, posit relevance and variability as objective characteristics of information. While they explain why people should pay attention to objectively salient information, they do not examine why people nevertheless fail to do so. A number of psychologists have examined such questions in greater depth. Tversky (1977) and Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) , among others, use a diagnosticity criterion to explain how people allocate attention. Information is diagnostic when it allows people to distinguish between alternatives (Skov and Sherman 1986) .
While similar to the notions of "salience" and "relevance" highlighted above, there is an important difference between these concepts and diagnosticity. Where the economists' work operationalizes salience/relevance with objective determinants, diagnosticity is determined through a more subjective process.
Diagnosticity is the product of a person's motivation for seeking information, their beliefs about the information's content, and the context in which the information is presented (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981, Medin, Goldstone and Gentner 1993) . 'Context' refers to the mode of presentation, the order of presentation, and the other information the individual is receiving at the same time. An important consideration is that changes in context can make certain details appear more or less diagnostic, even though their objective relevance remains constant. So, if people are already attending to a piece of information (e.g., reports about the total number of DJIA points), then changing the informational context can make objectively relevant details (e.g., the value of a DJIA point) more diagnostic.
To this end, Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) argue that diagnosticity is a function of available information. If a person finds a detail diagnostic when it is presented in one manner, he may not find it to be diagnostic when the information is presented in a different manner (e.g., when other available information changes). Skov and Sherman (1986) have shown that details that appear more variable are perceived to be more diagnostic than details that appear constant. So, when interpreting DJIA reports, people are more likely to focus on attributes whose presentation highlights their variability.
Hence, it is natural to see why many stock market reports emphasize changes in the number of DJIA points from day to day and why people tune in to learn about these changes.
These studies of diagnosticity provide a basis for thinking that alternate -and easy to implement --presentations of stock market information can redirect attention and counter point blindness. To this end, experimental research shows that presentational alterations in related domains can redirect attention. Bettman and Kakkar (1977) , for example, showed that subjects relied on brand names when available information was categorized by brand, yet relied on objectively relevant product attributes when information was categorized by these attributes. Jarvenpaa (1989) , Stone, Yates, and Parker (1997) , and Lurie and Mason (2007) describe work that shows similar result with graphic presentations. Jarvenpaa (1989: 299) , for example, finds that for many consumer decision contexts, "the graphical format mattered more than the task demands…" Such work suggests that presentation can have substantial effects on what informational details people will perceive as diagnostic.
Our content analysis shows that current news reports present DJIA information in ways that reinforce a particular pattern of selective attention that fuels point blindness. In most reports, changes in the numerical value of the index are highlighted and stand out as a variable factor, thus increasing their diagnosticity. Such presentations direct attention to changes in the number of DJIA points. They direct no attention to objectively relevant changes in the meaning of a DJIA point.
[Figures 4 about here.]
We contend that alternate presentational strategies can make variations in the value of DJIA points diagnostic. Consider Figure 4 , which puts the "bull market" of 2002-2007" in a different light. There, the DJIA's value is shown with respect to more than one currency. In this presentation, the DJIA is no longer the lone source of observable variation. This presentation adds diagnosticity to changes in the value of a DJIA point. Diagnosticity can similarly be added by conveying the ideas textually or verbally. Reporting DJIA closing values against other currencies can lead viewers or readers to draw inferences such as "at time T, the DJIA was up xx% against the dollar but was down yy% when measured in Euros and down zz% in Canadian dollar terms."
Can such presentations prompt viewers to think about DJIA points as something other than constants of little importance? Our reading of the literature on diagnosticity suggests that they can. We argue that presentations that show the value of the DJIA with respect to other meaningful measures of value can provide people with a basis for questioning whether the value of the oft-presented point metric should be so casually ignored. In particular, we contend that if the subject of our thought experiment had seen one or more of these alternate presentations, she would be less prone to point blindness.
To evaluate these predictions, we ran an experiment.
An Experiment on the Impact of Our Proposed Alternative
We conducted an experiment to evaluate whether alternate presentations of stock index information can affect public opinions of the stock market. We embedded the experiment in a survey. The survey was conducted by Knowledge Networks between The subjects in our study constitute a randomly selected subset of the KN panel and approximate a random sample of the U.S. adult population. Our survey was assigned to 3,059 KN panelists. Of those, 2,039 (66.6%) completed the study.
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The experiment began with all subjects answering a multiple-choice question. The question was: "What does the Dow Jones Industrial Average measure? The number of people who work for the Dow Jones company, the value of the stocks of major American companies, [or] the height of buildings used in industrial production." Over ninety-eight percent of subjects answered this question correctly. After being asked this question, all subjects were shown the correct answer. The purpose of this question was to document subjects' abilities to understand the content of our experimental stimuli and to provide a needed definition to subjects who did not answer the question correctly.
14 We then randomly assigned the 2039 subjects into one of eight experimental groups. One group, henceforth known as the control group, received no information about stock indices. All other subjects received information about the performance of the DJIA in the year 2007 (a.k.a., the stimulus). The only factor distinguishing the seven groups was the manner in which we conveyed this information.
One group received this news in a conventional way -the DJIA's performance was simply stated in USD terms. The phrase "In the year 2007, the value of the Dow Jones Industrial Average increased by 6% when measured in U.S. Dollars." appeared in the center of their screen for five seconds --at which point the subject was given the option to advance to the next screen.
Three other groups saw one of the following phrases under conditions identical to those just described: We refer to these three treatment groups collectively as "the single-currency treatments."
The three remaining treatment groups received two pieces of information in the center of the screen. The first piece of information for all three groups was the USDdenominated DJIA claim described above. The second piece of information was one of the three non-USD denominated DJIA claims (EURO, CAD, or Gold) listed above. We refer to these three treatment groups collectively as "the double-currency treatments."
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With this design in mind, it is important to note that no subjects were deceived in this experiment. While we manipulated the presentation of information across treatment groups, every claim about the DJIA is factually accurate (with percentages rounded).
After providing the stimulus, we asked all subjects who were exposed to a stimulus (everyone except control group subjects): "Given what you have just read, would you say that in the year 2007, the stock market performed "much better than you believed prior to starting this survey", "somewhat better than you believed prior to starting this survey", "the same as you believed prior to starting this survey", "somewhat worse than you believed prior to starting this survey", [or] "much worse than you believed prior to starting this survey." Figure 5 provides depicts subjects' responses within the single currency treatments as compared with the US Dollar group.
[ Figure was presented in non-USD terms, over 40% of subjects in the single-currency treatments thought worse of the stock market's performance. In other words, a single brief exposure to a non-USD delineated DJIA performance report doubled the percentage of subjects who responded that the stock market performed worse than they thought. For each of the three single-currency treatment groups, the difference between them and the USD group is statistically significant at the .001 level. At the same time, fewer than ten percent of subjects in the single-currency groups responded that the news that we presented to them made them feel better about the DJIA's performance (this compares to nearly 30% for the USD group). So, in a year where the decline in the value of the USD dragged down the value of a DJIA point relative to other value metrics, conveying stock index information in a manner designed to counter point blindness led a substantial number of people to adopt a very sobering view of the US stock market's most famous indicator. In this respect, our result follows that of Sausgruber and Tyran (2005) who use experiments to
show that subjects can, given proper feedback, learn to adapt to a real-nominal blindness associated with indirect taxation.
In some cases, it will not be practical for a media outlet to produce a story that frames stock index performance only in a non-USD currency. It remains to determine 16 The fact that this USD-based description of the 2007 DJIA makes our subjects feel better on balance suggests that at the time we conducted this survey the average person believed that the DJIA performed worse in 2007 than it actually had when performance is measured in USD terms. For people who are blind to the fact that a DJIA point value declined in 2007, the "news" contained in our stimulus is interpreted as good.
whether reports that contain both a USD-based report of a stock index along with a non-USD based presentation can counter point blindness. To examine this matter, we turn to an evaluation of the double-currency groups. Figure 6 depicts their reactions relative to the US Dollar group.
[ Figure 6 about here.]
These results mirror the results from the single currency treatments: people who receive information in other currencies rather than just the US Dollar make different evaluations. In only one case (USD & Ounce of Gold) does the difference reach conventional levels of statistical significance. While the magnitude of double-currency effects is smaller than in the single-currency effects, the general direction of the effects is the same as described above. That said, it is worth remembering these results are the product of a single exposure to information that may be as brief as five seconds long.
There is no announcer or accompanying text that puts the two sentences into context. As such verbal or textual reinforcements often accompany the presentation of DJIA information, ours is a conservative test of the proposition that alternate presentations of stock index information can counter point blindness.
To further document whether alternate presentation strategies affect public opinion about the stock market, we asked all subjects the following question, "How would you rate the overall condition of the stock market in the year 2007?" Subjects could respond "Very Good", "Somewhat Good", "Neither Good nor Bad", "Somewhat Bad", [or] "Very Bad." Figure 7 depicts these results for the single-currency and doublecurrency treatment groups, respectively. It highlights the percentage of subjects in each group who responded "somewhat bad" or "very bad" to the question.
[ Figures 7a and 7b about here.]
The first thing to notice in Figure 7a is the relationship between the USD group and the control group. Roughly 40% of the control group subjects, who received no information about the 2007 stock market, described its condition as bad. Of the subjects who had earlier been reminded that the DJIA actually increased in value, when measured in USD, in 2007, 34% described the stock market's condition as being bad. The difference between this group and the control group suggests that without prompting, citizens in February of 2008 (a bad time for the Dow) remembered the DJIA's 2007 performance as being worse than it actually was.
In Figure 7a , over 50% of treatment group subjects described the stock market's condition as some form of "bad." So subjects in the single-currency treatment groups graded the stock market's health as significantly worse than those who were told about DJIA performance in USD terms. In Figure 7b , the results from the double-currency treatments are in the same direction as the single-currency results, but the magnitudes of the effects are smaller. Considered altogether, the results from Figures 5-7 suggest that even a single brief exposure to DJIA information presented in non-USD terms can change how Americans evaluate the stock market.
In 1979, Modigliani and Cohn argued that investors who fail to adjust long-term expectations about expected growth to variations in inflation would undervalue stocks when inflation is high and undervalue them when inflation is low (also see Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2005) We have shown that changes in perspective can come from slight alterations to the traditional presentation of financial news. Altering the presentation of existing reports can make objectively relevant attributes of stock market reports increasingly diagnostic to readers. We recommend that news outlets that offer daily reports about the DJIA and other indices regularly report their value in terms of other focal assets, such as the Euro.
Such presentations will offer citizens the ability to draw new inferences from everyday financial news. These inferences, in turn, can lead them to make better choices regarding personal finance and ask better questions about the extent to which their plans are affected by government fiscal and monetary policies. For example, people can hold assets whose value is tied to other currencies, but they require certain kinds of information if they are to consider doing so. One way to help people understand think about such possibilities is to offer information about common investment vehicles in ways that counter "point blindness."
People who have such knowledge are less likely to be negatively affected by knowable threats to their financial futures. As an increasing number of Americans now bear greater risks in planning for their financial futures (Hacker 2006) , it is important to try to reduce such negative consequences when possible. To that end, we have shown that small changes in the emphasis and content of stock market reports can lead people to pay more attention to the changing meaning of DJIA points which can, in turn, improve their understanding of focal economic phenomena. J a n -0 1 J a n -0 2 J a n -0 3 J a n -0 4 J a n -0 5 J a n -0 6 
